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In Federalist Papers No. 10, James Madison, writing under the pseudonym Publius, lamented the 
dangers of what he called “faction.” Factions—which we might today call political parties—held 
corruptive influence over the political process because such entities develop independent, institutional 
instincts toward self-preservation that may eventually become antagonistic to the interests of the broader 
people. Republicanism, managed through the reasonable faculties of men, would be to the cure to faction, 
Madison envisioned. Nevertheless, just over two decades from Federalist 10’s publication in 1787, 
Madison ran for president of the United States at the head of the 1808 Democratic-Republican ticket, and 
thus became the leader of the largest faction hitherto known in American politics. But Madison was far 
from the only Founding Father to change his position on political parties. “If I could not go to heaven but 
with a party,” Thomas Jefferson shared privately with a friend, “I would not go there at all.”1 Nevertheless, 
when time came for Jefferson to express his presidential ambitions at the turn of the 19th century, he stood 
as the Democratic-Republican candidate. In Jefferson’s estimation, he later wrote, when the chasm that 
separates the parties is cavernous, it is “honorable to take a firm and decided part and […] immoral to 
pursue a middle line, as between the parties of honest men and rogues, into which every country is 
divided.”2 Thus, in the republic’s infancy, parties were cemented as the primary means of political 
organization in the American system of governance. 
I. Toward a Theory of Party 
The near-omnipresence of political parties in free, democratic societies has risen to the status of 
inevitability. E. E. Schattschneider asserted that “political parties created democracy,” and therefore, 
“democracy is unthinkable save in terms of parties.”3 But what is a political party? Why do they form so 
consistently across democratic nations? Is the policy and administrative direction a political party more 
 
1 Marty Cohen et al., The Party Decides: Presidential Nominations Before and After Reform (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2008), 19. 
2 Ibid. 
3 E. E. Schattschneider, Party Government (New York: Rinehart, 1942), 1. Quoted in Aldrich 1995, 3. 
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directed by candidates, officeholders, or party leaders? Political scientists have negotiated with these 
questions over almost the past century and produced a number of distinct answers.  
Joseph Schumpeter, the Austrian-born Harvard political economist, offered the first traces of a 
modern theory of party in his 1942 work Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. Schumpeter offered a 
competitive model of party, in which politicians compete with each other for the support of the public. 
Then, in Anthony Down’s 1957 book An Economic Theory of Democracy, the focus on competition 
among politician in the Schumpeter conception is displaced with an emphasis on competition between 
parties. Thus, shifts in the interior configurations of organized political parties were largely attributed to 
exogenous shocks from the moves of rival parties. Political parties, in the Schumpeter-Downs framework, 
become reactionary rivals vying for popular attention. Critics point to the numerous political actors—
organizers, grassroots activists, and perhaps even actual voters—whom this model silences amid the 
raucous scuffles of inter-party conflict. Even so, this Schumpeter-Downs model of party gained 
prominence in the 1960s as the study of political organization expanded. Meanwhile, the actual effect that 
parties were demonstrated to have in the operation of the political system seemed to weaken. At the state 
and federal level, it seemed that as the party nomination process was reformed, with the McGovern-Fraser 
reforms particularly notable, the power that party leaders had to affect political outcomes seemed infirm 
and insignificant. 
The apparent weakening of party power also weakened the saliency of studying political 
organization and political parties. The field branched off into various directions, with different sets of 
scholars developing a theory of party to explain parochial aspects of overall party functions. This was 
until John Aldrich wrote perhaps the most important work in the field of party theory in the recent history 
of political science. Aldrich’s 1995 book Why Parties? compiled and synthesized the research literature 
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on political parties into a sort of grand unifying theory of why and how political parties assert their 
positions in the American political system.  
In Why Parties? Aldrich built upon an unpublished paper by UCLA theorist Thomas Schwartz, in 
which Schwartz imagined a hypothetical legislature of three. Schwartz thought that in such a circumstance, 
two of the three legislators would cooperate to secure the greatest gains for their constituents while shifting 
the losses onto the constituents of the third legislator. He called such cooperation a “long coalition”.4 
These long coalitions create a set of permanent winners who have great incentive to cooperate with each 
other on a wide range of issues to ensure that the agenda most favorable to their collective and individual 
interests is enacted. Schwartz contended that political parties form on the basis of a straightforward, 
rational calculation: separate, the lawmakers are ineffective in a body that governs by majority rule; 
together, the can secure significant gains for themselves and their stakeholders, even if those gains are not 
entirely what the sought. In such a Hobson’s choice, achieving some legislative victories is a better 
condition than endless bickering that achieves nothing at all. 
Aldrich advances Schwartz framework by expanding it beyond the theoretical legislature and into 
legislatures that govern. Why Parties? introduces the archetype of the ambitious politician. Political 
parties, Aldrich thought, were the progeny of ambitious officeholders, office seekers, and politicians. They 
do not form these parties to direct the benefits of the coalition to their constituents, although they do care 
that their constituents are content and that the foundations of public policy are sound. What drives these 
political actors, in Aldrich’s estimation, is the next election. Securing the right to govern depends of 
winning popular support in polling booths. This is what ultimately matters to the ambitious officeholder 
and thus forms the basis of here drive to ensconce herself in the ranks of a political party. Aldrich further 
argued that, though his argument advanced a candidate-centered theory of party, the precise nature of the 
 
4 Cohen et al., The Party Decides, 26. 
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support that political parties offered to candidates had changed over time. Previously, parties focused on 
what Aldrich called “mass mobilization”—featuring patronage, spoil systems, and political machines—
that moved voters toward candidates. Today, parties are “in-service” actors. They move candidates closer 
to voters through training, consultants, polling, and fundraising. While candidates form their own 
campaigns, build their own message, and run on their own merit under the in-service party model, the 
ends of both the mass mobilization party and in-service party are traced back a single center of gravity: 
getting ambitious office seekers into office and keeping ambitious officeholders in their positions.5 
The Schwartz-Aldrich theory of party offers answers two three substantial questions that are 
fundamental to this project’s research: what are political parties? Why do they form? How do they operate? 
A political party is a stable coalition of officeholders and office seekers who agree to cooperate on a wide 
range of issues in order to build a winning coalition that secures political advantage in elections and 
lawmaking. The political party forms a brand of sorts that becomes a shorthand for the beliefs, interests, 
and values of the politicians, officeholders, and office seekers who walk under that party’s banner. In turn, 
this brand reduces the transaction costs associated with seeking and maintaining office. Office seekers and 
officeholders need not reintroduce themselves to the public each election because the party brand does 
this on their behalf. Further, through services like electoral training and polling, the party helps office 
seekers win elections. 
II. Long Coalitions in Virginia’s Chambers 
a. Research Design 
This project seeks to build upon the body of research literature that the Schwartz-Aldrich theory 
has already generated by exploring the strength of party coalitions in Virginia’s General Assembly. 
Specifically, the theory’s emphasis on the pursuit of electoral majorities as the central motive force for 
 
5 Cohen et al., The Party Decides, 26–28. 
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ambitious officeholders and office seekers seems to imply that, upon achieving such an electoral majority, 
the long coalition grows stronger and more cohesive. This strengthening in the ties that bind lawmakers 
in the governing party is vital in ensuring that they may execute on their legislative capacity with greatest 
profit. 
This research seeks to answer the question: do members of the majority caucus show greater 
loyalty to their caucus’ interests than members of the minority caucus by voting with the caucus at a 
greater frequency? This question is rooted in the premises of the Schwartz-Aldrich theory of party. Long 
coalitions emerge from the ambitions of a community of officeholders and office seekers. Its aims are 
focused on heightening the electoral and legislative advantage of being in the majority by cooperating 
across a wide range of issues. Taking this as an axiom, it ought to follow that the voting patterns of those 
who are members of the majority, governing caucus would be more closely aligned with each other than 
those members of the minority, non-governing caucus. Further, we might also assume, on the basis of the 
aforementioned axiom, that the relationship between caucus unity among the members of the majority 
caucus and the partisan lean of the majority members’ districts would be weak. Conversely, the association 
between caucus unity in the minority caucus and the partisan leans of minority member districts would 
share a stronger relationship than that of the majority caucus. We might further postulate, based on the 
long coalition axiom, that caucus unity, once quantified, would be skewed toward the upper strata of a 
caucus unity distribution. 
b. Methodology 
In statistical terms, supporting the long coalitions thesis in state legislatures requires testing several 
aspects of the thesis. First, we must prove that the voting patterns of majority members are more unified 
than the voting patterns of minority members. In order to prove this, this research will use caucus unity 
percentages, denoted as 𝐶, which is the proportion of votes in which a member voted with their caucus on 
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the floor in circumstances where two thirds of the caucus voted in the same way. Mathematically, 𝐶 is 
expressed as: 
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑡𝑤𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑟𝑑𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑐𝑢𝑠
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑡𝑤𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑟𝑑𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑐𝑢𝑠 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑤𝑎𝑦
∗ 100 
 
This project will compare the caucus unity in the majority and minority caucuses taking the average caucus 
unity percentage and comparing these sample statistics directly. We expect the mean caucus unity 
percentage to be higher in the majority caucus than in the minority caucus, which would demonstrate 
higher levels of cohesion in voting patterns among members of the majority caucus. This project would 
seek to further examine caucus unity by calculating the average distance around the mean caucus unity 
percentage, which is the standard deviation, denoted here as 𝜎, where, 







In order to offer statistical evidence of the long coalitions thesis, we expect that the standard deviation in 
the majority caucus will be similar to or smaller than the standard deviation in caucus unity percentages 
of the minority caucus’s members. Finally, we expect that the median caucus unity percentage in the 
majority caucus will be higher than the median caucus unity in the minority caucus. Further, to test the 
relationship between caucus unity percentages and partisan lean, we must calculate a Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient or Pearson’s r to determine the size and magnitude of the association. Prior to this, however, 
we must offer some methodology to calculate partisan lean, or 𝑝. First, we calculate the presidential district 
spread by subtracting the percentage of votes obtained by the last Republican presidential candidate in the 
district from the percentage of votes obtained by the Democratic presidential candidate: 
𝑥𝑑 =  𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 − 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 
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We do a similar calculation for the previous gubernatorial election: 
𝑦𝑑 =  𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝑔𝑢𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 − 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑔𝑢𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 





We repeat these calculations for the two parties’ candidates across the state in the last presidential and 
gubernatorial elections, to calculate average statewide spread 𝑠: 
𝑥𝑠 = 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑒 − 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑒 





Then, we average 𝑑 and 𝑠 to get partisan lean 𝑝. If 𝑝 has a negative value, this indicates a Democratic 
partisan lean. Having calculated the partisan leans of each district, we compute a Pearson’s r between the 
absolute values of partisan leans and the caucus unity percentages for the members of the majority and 
minority caucuses, as well as those in strong (𝑝 ≥ 20), leaning (𝑝 < 20; ≥ 10) or competitive (𝑝 < 10) 
districts. We will further compute correlations for Democratic and Republican incumbents. Finally, we 
describe that coefficient in terms of a weak, moderate, or strong positive or negative relationship. In order 
to determine the skew in the caucus unity distribution, we will build a density function and plot that 
function in a visualization.6 
 
6 The data used in this research, as well as the methodology to calculate partisan lean, is adapted from the Virginia Public 
Access Project. 
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c. Results 

























The results of the methodology above tended to 
support my assertion that the majority caucus 
shows greater cohesion than minority caucuses. 
The average caucus unity percentage in the 
House Democratic caucus during the 2020 
regular session, in which Democrats held the 
majority, was 93.6 percent. In other words, if 
one were to postulate a theoretical Caucus Democrat, an individual who voted perfectly in line with the 
mean of the caucus, that individual would vote with their caucus on about 94 out of every 100 floor votes. 
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Meanwhile, House Republicans had 
an average caucus unity percentage of 87.3 
percent. Thus, a similarly situated, theoretical 
Caucus Republican would vote with their 
caucus on 87 out of every 100 floor votes. The 
Caucus Democrat would show greater loyalty 
to the interests of the Democratic caucus than 
would the Caucus Republican to the 
Republican caucus. The median caucus unity 
percentage in the Democratic caucus was 95 
percent, substantially higher than the 88 
percent median caucus unity percentage 
among House Republicans. Further, the 
interquartile range for the median Democratic 
caucus unity percentages is 3 percent. For the Republican caucus, the interquartile range is 6 percent. 
Finally, the average distance 𝜎 around the mean caucus unity percentage is 6.1 percent in the Democratic 
caucus. This is nearly equal to 𝜎 computed for the Republican caucus, which was 5.9 percent. 
 
























1Values rounded to the nearest tenth. 
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This result contrasts with the patterns 
of caucus unity seen in the 2019 regular 
session. During that session, House 
Republicans were in the majority. The mean 
caucus unity percentage in the Democratic 
caucus was 89.6 percent with 𝜎 of 6.2 
percent. In the Republican caucus, mean 
caucus unity was 88.6 percent with 𝜎 of 7.9 percent. Meanwhile, the median caucus unity percentage in 
the Democratic caucus was 90 percent with an interquartile range of 6.5 percent. The Republican caucus 
has a median caucus unity percentage of 89.5 percent with an interquartile range of 10.75 percent. 
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 In the Senate, a similar trend 
emerges upon examining the data on 
caucus unity. The mean caucus 
unity percentage in the Senate 
Democratic caucus, which was in 
the majority during the 2020 regular 
session, was 90.8 percent with 𝜎 of 
6.2 percent. This means that a 
theoretical Caucus Democrat in the Senate would 
vote with their party on about 91 out of every 100 
floor votes. In the Senate Republican caucus, the 
mean caucus unity percentage was 84.5 percent with 
𝜎 of 7.1 percent. Thus, a postulated Caucus 
Republican would vote with their caucus on 85 out 
of every 100 floor votes. The median caucus unity percentage in the Republican caucus was 87 percent 
with an interquartile range of 10.5 percent. In the Democratic caucus, the median caucus unity percentage 
was 92 percent with an interquartile range of 6 percent. 
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 In comparison to the 2020 regular session, 
Senate Democrats in the 2019 regular session had 
a mean caucus unity percentage of 86.9 percent 
with 𝜎 of 6.5 percent. Senate Republicans, 
meanwhile, had a mean caucus unity percentage of 
87.4 percent with 𝜎 of 8.2 percent. The median 
caucus unity percentage was 89 percent for Senate Democrats, with an interquartile range of 5 percent. 
Senate Republicans had a median caucus unity percentage of 89.5 percent and an interquartile range of 
6.5 percent. 
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 Finally, the relationship between 
partisan lean and caucus unity in the House 
Democratic caucus during the 2020 regular 
session has a Pearson’s r of 0.093; the 
relationship for House Republicans is 
0.269. For comparison, the magnitude 
trend in the Pearson’s r for the two 
caucuses was reversed in the 2019 regular session, with the smaller correlation coefficient (0.011) seen 
among House Republicans and the larger correlation coefficient (0.268) among Senate Democrats. The 
association between mean caucus unity and partisan lean among Senate Republicans in the 2020 regular 
session had a Pearson’s r of 0.176, 
compared with 0.066 for Senate 
Democrats. Similar to the House of 
Delegates, the trend in magnitude was in 
reverse in the 2019 regular session—Senate 
Republicans had a Pearson correlation 
coefficient of 0.069 and Senate Democrats 
had a correlation coefficient of 0.250. 
III. Conclusion 
 On the basis of this research, the preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that there is a 
substantial increase in cohesion that results from the minority party becoming the governing party—as 
was the case with Democrats from 2019 to 2020. The mean caucus unity percentage for House Democrats 
increased by about 4.5 percent between 2019 and 2020. House Republicans, meanwhile, saw their unity 
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decline by about 1.5 percent. In the Senate, Democrats saw a similar upward trend in cohesion, with their 
mean caucus unity percentage increased by about 4.3 percent, while Republicans saw their cohesion 
decrease, with their mean caucus unity percentage decreasing by about 3.3 percent. Further, the median 
caucus unity increased in Senate Democrats by about 3.4 percent, while the median for Senate Republicans 
decreased by around 2.8 percent. The Pearson’s r between caucus unity percentages in the House and 
Senate Democratic caucuses declined substantially between 2019 and 2020. This is consistent with our 
expectations, because the greater the unity within the governing caucus, the less of a determinant partisan 
lean becomes in voting patterns. The opposite trend was seen among House and Senate Republicans. 
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